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COMMENTS
SHAREHOLDER INSPECTION RIGHTS
The early English case of Dominus Rex v. The Fraternityof Hostmen in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne' was one of the first cases to recognize the right of stockholders to inspect corporate books. In a dictum
the court said,
It does not seem settled
mandamus for a general
corporation. Vide Rex v.
manor have this right as

how far corporators have a right to apply a
inspection and copying of the books of the
G. Babb, 3 Term Rep. 579. But tenants of a
to the court rolls, &c. Rex v. Shelly, 3 term

Rep. 141.

The last sentence possibly indicates that the right was originally
recognized upon an analogy to the old quasi-feudal right of the
tenants of a manor to inspect the court rolls. Whatever may be
the validity of this surmise as to the origin of the right, the commonlaw right became well established in this country prior to the beginning of this century.! The rule was generally stated as being
that the shareholder had the right to inspect the books of the corporation at reasonable times, if the inspection was in good faith
and for a proper purpose. Quite a few states followed the English
rule of requiring that there be a specific dispute before inspection
would be granted. Many state legislatures, evidently feeling that the
shareholder should have more power over that which he partially
owns, enacted statutes that usually gave the shareholder an unqualified right to inspect the corporate books. The more recent
history of the inspection right has been an effort on the part of
the legislatures and the courts to put reasonable limitations upon
its use, but still to allow the right to persons using it for socially
desirable purposes.
For the most part this Comment will concern the law of three
jurisdictions: Texas, Illinois, and Delaware. The Illinois cases are
discussed because the Illinois Business Corporations Act' was one
of the source acts for the Texas act; and Delaware cases are discussed
because of the vast number of corporations incorporated in that
state.
12 Str. 1223, 93 Eng. Rep. 1144 (K.B. 1745).
159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E. 108 (1899)
3ill. Ann. Stat. c. 32 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
2See In re Steinway,

and cases cited there.
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WHAT BOOKS MAY BE INSPECTED?

Generally the shareholder can inspect whatever records are necessary to inform him about corporate matters in which he has a legitamate interest. Evidently the common-law right and the statutes
usually cover all normally kept records, plus whatever is required
to be kept by statute, for no instance has been noticed in which
the scope of the examination has been objected to on the grounds
that the particular records were not open to inspection under any
conditions. However it has generally been held that the inspection
right does not extend to records containing trade or business secrets.'
Such holdings should not be considered an exception to the general
rule since they seem to be based on the purpose of the inspection
rather than an idea that no right of inspection of these books exists.
That is, it seems that if the inspection of the secrets is actually necessary, and if the inspection can be made in such a manner that it
will not harm the corporation by a divulgence of the secrets, the
inspection will be allowed.
Since in Texas the inspection right is statutory, the words of the
statutes must be examined. Article 1, 28," which still affects many
Texas corporations,' requires that a record of the stock subscribed
and transferred and of all business transactions be kept and that
these be open to shareholder inspection. One Texas case' decided
under this statute held that "records, books of accounts, receipts,
vouchers, bills and all other documents evidencing the financial
condition" could be inspected. Otherwise the Texas decisions do
not add anything to our knowledge of the permissable scope of
inspection, most of the demands consisting only of requests to see
"books and records,' "books, records and papers,"'" and the like.
Article 2.44" of the Texas Business Corporations Act is also ap'Electro-Formation,
Inc. v. Ergon Research Laboratories, Inc., 284 Mass. 392, 187
N.E. 827 (1933).
'News-Journal Corp. v. State, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271 (1939).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1328 (1945).
'Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 9.14 (1956) sets out the corporations to which the new
act applies and provides a procedure whereby existing corporatons may adopt the provisions of the new act.
'Johnson Ranch Royalty Co. v. Hickey, 31 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error
ref.
'Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
"Guaranty Old Line Life Co. v. McCallum, 97 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
" Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 2.44 (1956) reads as follows:
BOOKS AND RECORDS
A. Each corporation shall keep correct and complete books and records of account and
shall keep minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and board of directors, and
shall keep at its registered office or principal place of business, or at the office of its transfer agent or registrar, a record of its shareholders, giving the names and addresses of all
shareholders and the number and class of the shares held by each.
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plicable to many Texas corporations at present."2 This provision
concerns shareholder inspection rights and states that the shareholders may inspect the corporate "books and records of account,
minutes, and record of shareholders, and shall be entitled to make
extracts therefrom." There are as yet no Texas decisions under this
statute and again the most persuasive precedent is that of Illinois.
The Illinois decision, like the Texas decisions under article 1328,
add little to the statute, the demands all being for records that
are expressly mentioned in the statute. The only helpful case is
Stone v. Kellog,3 which held that corporate contracts can be inspected by the shareholder. This is also the usual rule elsewhere.'
It should be noted that article 2.30 of the Texas act gives the
holder of a voting trust certificate the right to inspect the counterpart of the voting agreement deposited with the corporation. It
also provides that shareholders of the corporation shall have the
same right of inspection of the counterpart that they have as to
other books and records.
In Delaware the inspection right is derived from the common
law, rather than statutory provisions, except for inspection of the
stock ledgers which is provided for in section 220 of title 8 of the
Delaware Code." The books that the court allowed to be inspected
in State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co.," will illustrate the extent to which records may be examined in Delaware.
B. Any person who shall have been a shareholder of record for at least six (6) months
immediately preceding his demand, or who shall be the holder of record of at least five
per cent (5%) of all the outstanding shares of a corporation, upon written demand stating
the purpose thereof, shall have the right to examine, in person or by agent or attorney,
at any reasonable time or times, for any proper purpose, its books and records of account,
minutes, and record of shareholders, and shall be entitled to make extracts therefrom.
C. Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competent jurisdiction, upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose, irrespective of the period of time
during which such shareholder shall have been a shareholder of record, and irrespective
of the number of shares held by him, to compel the production, for examination by such
shareholder, of the books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders of
a corporation.
is See note 7 supra.
3 165 Il. 192, 46 N.E. 222 (1896).
"4Birmingham News Co. v. State ex rel. Dunston, 207 Ala. 440, 93 So. 25 (1922);
Klotz v. Pan-American Match Co., 221 Mass. 38, 108 N.E. 764 (1915).
"The text of Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (1953) is as follows:
5 220. Stock ledger; inspection; evidence
The original or duplicate stock ledger shall be the only evidence as to who are the
stockholders entitled to examine the list required by section 219 of this title or the books
of the corporation, or to vote in person or by proxy at any such election. The original
or duplicate stock ledger containing the names and addresses of the stockholders, and the
number of shares held by them, respectively, shall, at all times, during the usual hours
for business, be open to the examination of every stockholder at its principal office or
place of business in this State, and said original or duplicate stock ledger shall be evidence
in all courts of this State.
624 Del. 379, 77 Ati. 16 (1910).
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The court permitted an examination of the minute books of the
director's meetings for the last seven years, the books of account
of the corporation that showed the amounts received from the sale
of preferred stock during the last seven years and the disposition
of these funds, the stock book of the preferred shareholders, the
stock book of the common shareholders, the books showing the
amount of business done during the last four years, and the statements submitted to the directors which showed the business done
by the company, its profit and loss, and assets and liabilities, during
each six-month period for the last five years. It must be remembered that the shareholder only had this broad right of inspection
because the court felt that all these records were necessary for the
shareholder's purposes. In Swift v. State ex rel. Richardson17 it was
held that the shareholder could inspect pertinent contracts, conveyances of franchises and tangible property, and all records showing
net earnings of the company during pertinent years. Other types
of corporate records that have been held subject to inspection in
other jurisdictions are correspondence relevant to the information
the shareholder is seeking,18 and work sheets and schedules showing
segregated costs of the corporation's real property."
A separate problem is presented when the shareholder seeks to
inspect books of a subsidiary corporation. The rule seems to be
that he can inspect the books of the subsidiary corporation if the
subsidiary is dominated and controlled by the parent,"0 the extent
of the control being the determinative fact. The Delaware case of
Martin v. D. B. Martin Co."1 held that under the facts presented
that the inspection of the subsidiary's books could be obtained. A
later Delaware case, State ex rel. Rogers v. Sherman Oil Co.2 dis-

tinguished the Martin Case on the grounds that
(1) It was in a court of equity where the principles of law are not so
controlling as in this (law) court. (2) The companies that were required to produce their books and disclose the information required in
connection with the charge of fraudulent mismanagement or corporate
affairs, were practically one and the same in so far as management and
control were concerned .... The president of the respondent company
was president of all the allied companies but one, the respondent company owned all the shares of stock of seven of them.
1712 Del. 338, 6 Atl. 856 (1886).
" Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich, 187 Ky. 423,

219 S.W. 191 (1920); Dintenfass v.
Amber Star Films Corp., 39 R.I. 555, 99 Atl. 516 (1917).
'OState ex rel. McClure v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646

(1922).
2"Bailey v. Boxboard Products Co., 314 Pa. 45, 170
21 0 Del. Ch. 211, 88 Ati. 612 (1913).
2231 Del. 570, 117 Atl. 122, 126 (Super. Ct. 1922).

Atl. 127 (1934).
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The court also pointed out that there were interlocking directo-

rates. The only Texas case on this point is in line with the general
rule."
Speculations as to what other corporate records are subject to inspection must be guided by the general rule that if the shareholder
has a right to the knowledge he seeks, he can have access to whatever corporate records will give him the information, provided that
the inspection will not result in substantial harm, to the corporation.
4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in Otis-Hidden Co. v. Scheirich"
said, in holding certain correspondence of the corporate president
to be subject to inspection:

It is a rare thing that all the transactions of a corporation are clearly
shown by its records of official action. There must, of necessity, be
many transactions which cannot be clearly understood except by reference to various documents, papers, and correspondence on file with
the coporation. Clearly the stockholder's right to inspect his own
should not be confined to official action.
Thus it would seem that the shareholder can inspect such things as
tax returns and Securities and Exchange Commission Reports if he
can show that they are necessary to obtaining an undistorted view
of the knowledge he is seeking. 2 It should be noted that in Delaware, as contrasted to Texas and Illinois, if the shareholder has
been furnished in the form of regular financial reports all the information necessary for his purposes, then he cannot get mandamus
for inspection."6 In Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp.7 the Texas Commission of Appeals held that the corporation could not defeat the
shareholder's right of inspection by offering him audits and financial statements prepared at the request of the corporation. The reason for this, the court said, is that the right of inspection given by
article 1328 is absolute and can not be bartered away by the officers
of the corporation. The Illinois case of Furst v. W. T. Rawleigh
Medical Co." is in accord. Both the Texas and Illinois cases just
cited were decided under the older so-called absolute statutes in
the respective states, but there is no apparent reason for the courts
holding otherwise under the new laws. Since the Delaware court
recognizes the rule that the corporation's audits and statements
"Williams

v. Freeport Sulphur Co., 40 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).

24187 Ky. 423, 219 S.W. 191 (1920).
"Kemp v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 128 N.J.L. 322, 26 A.2d 70 (Sup. Ct.
1942) (allowed "federal reports" to be inspected).
2State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 Ati. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931).
2759 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
28282 I11. 366, 118 N.E. 763 (1918).
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cannot be substituted for the records from which they were drawn
if there is something to indicate that they are fraudulent, unreliable or inadequate, the Delaware rule seems preferable since it

protects the corporation from unnecessary inspections while at the
same time leaving the substantial rights of the shareholder unimpaired.
Another aspect of this problem of what books may be inspected
is whether the court can order the inspection of books not located

within the jurisdiction. Texas has no decisions on this problem
under article 1328, and neither have any Illinois decisions been
found. However a Delaware case has been found that deals with the
9
matter. In State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co."
the
books which the shareholder wished to see were in Philadelphia. The
court held that since the corporation was within the jurisdiction
of the courts of Delaware, there was no reason it could not be
compelled to discharge a legal duty resting upon it by being ordered
to bring the out-of-state books for the inspection of the shareholder.
This ruling seems to be correct because the jurisdiction is not being
exercised on the books which are outside the jurisdiction, but on the
officers of the corporation, and the corporation itself which are
within the state.
WHAT ASSISTANCE

MAY THE SHAREHOLDER

MAKING

HAVE IN

THE INSPECTION?

The general rule is that the stockholder may have the help of
whatever agents he wishes in inspecting the records." The specific
cases have been situations either of attorneys or accountants helping
the shareholder, or actually being the only ones making the inspection, the shareholder not being present while the inspection was
being made; however there is no reason to think that the shareholder
could not have other specialists to aid him in the inspection. This
seems to be reasonable since very often the shareholder himself will
not have the necessary technical knowledge to make an intelligent
inspection, and to hold to the contrary would substantially divest him
of this right. The Texas case holding that under article 1328 agents
of the shareholder could make the inspection is Johnson Ranch Royalty Co. v. Hickey." The Illinois courts are in accord with this rule,"
but they also add to it. In Crouse v. Rogers Park Apartments, Inc."
the shareholder demanded through his attorney to be allowed to
24 Del. 379, 77 Atl. 16 (1910).
a°Ballantine, Lattin & Jennings, Cases and Materials on Corporations 396 (2d ed. 1953).
S'31 S.W.2d 150 (Tex, Civ. App. 1930) error ref.
" Robb v. Eastgate Hotel, Inc., 347 Ill.App. 261, 106 N.E.2d 848 (1952); Crouse
v. Rogers Park Apartments, Inc., 343 Ill. App. 3'19, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951).
33343 I1l. App. 319, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951).
29
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inspect and copy the record of shareholders in order that he might
offer to buy their stock. The court held that the shareholder could
make the demand and inspection through his attorney, but the corporation could demand proof of the fact that the attorney actually
did represent the shareholder and could deny inspection to the attorney in the absence of such proof. In a later case, Robb v. Eastgate
Hotel, Inc.,' the court explained that though the corporation has
the right to demand proof of agency from the attorney, if it does
not so demand, it cannot later use this as a reason for its refusal
of the inspection. Both of these decisions are very reasonable and
any other holding would be surprising, but surprises of this nature
are not uncommon, and so decisions on the matter are reassuring.
The Delaware rule is the same."
WHAT ARE REASONABLE

TIMES FOR INSPECTION?

All the statutes giving the inspection right contain the proviso
that the right must be exercised at a reasonable time. Under article
1328 there was some contention that the inspection had to be made
at one occasion or at least on consecutive days. The Texas cases of
Johnson Ranch Realty Co. v. Hickey" and Smith v. Trumbull Farmers Gin Co." settled the law to be that the inspection need not be
at one time or on consecutive days, and could evidently be on as
many different occasions as were reasonably necessary to make the
inspection. Neither does there seem to be any absolute amount of
time that is the maximum allowed for the inspection. The wording
of article 2.44 obviated this problem by saying that the inspection
could be made at any reasonable "time or times." Evidently the
only meaning of "reasonable time" is that the inspection must be
made during the regular business hours of the corporation.
WHAT Is THE NATURE OF THE DEMAND AND THE PLEADINGS?

Should the demand be in writing? Of course this is always good
practice, but it is often not required. Article 2.44 of the new Texas
act requires that the demand be written, but the Illinois act does
not so require, nor does the wording of article 1328 of the Texas
statutes or the decisions under it." Nor can any requirement of
written demand be found in any of the Delaware cases, either under
34347 Ill. App. 261,

106 N.E.2d 848 (1912).
"State ex rel. Bloch v. Sentry Safety Control Corp., 41 Del. 480, 24 A.2d 587 (Super.
Ct. 1942).
3631 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) error ref.
37 89 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
38See, e.g., Johnson Ranch Royalty Co. v. Hickey, 31 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.. Civ. App.
1930) error ref.
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the common-law right to inspect the books or under the statutory
right to inspect stock ledgers given by title 8 section 220."'
How specific should the demand be as to purpose? In the Illinois
case of People ex tel. Miles v. Bowen Industries, Inc.,4° the demand
simply inquired as to when it would be convenient for the shareholder to inspect the books. When the inspection was refused the
shareholder sued for a writ of mandamus ordering the inspection.
The court refused to issue the writ, holding that it was necessary
for the shareholder, upon trial, to prove a demand which evidenced
a proper purpose; that is, the demand itself should have evidenced
a specific purpose and this purpose must have been a proper one.
The reason for this, said the court, was that by the statute the legislature intended to protect corporations from demands for inspection that were insincere and intended only to harass. This purpose cannot be served unless the officers are informed of the reason
for the -inspection and given a chance to determine whether or not
it is proper. The purpose of the suit for mandamus is to determine
judicially whether the officers properly decided that the purpose of
the inspection was improper.
A dictum in a Delaware case was to the contrary."1 The differences
in the two cases can be explained by the differences in the burden
of proof of proper purpose in the two states. In Illinois the burden
of proof of proper purpose is on the shareholder, while in Deleware, when the stock ledger is sought to be inspected, the burden is
on the corporation to prove an improper purpose on the part of
the shareholder in seeking the inspection. The Delaware court reasoned: "If a stockholder need not affirmatively allege in a petition
for mandamus the purpose of a desired examination, then surely
he need not allege his purpose in his original request to the corporation itself, and thus subject himself to the examination and crossexamination of the corporate officials."4 However it must be noticed
that the rule in Delaware as to the burden of proof or proper purpose is different where the general corporate books are the object
of the inspection. In this latter case, therefore, it would seem that
the pleadings would need to be the same as in Illinois.
What are the elements of the pleadings in a suit for mandamus?

Under article 1328, the court in Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp."
" Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (1953). See note 15 supra for text.
40327 IlI. App. 362, 64 N.E.2d 213 (1945).

"tState ex. rel. Dixon v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 42 Del. 423, 36 A.2d 29 (SuperCt.2 1944).
4 1d. at 36 A.2d 31.
4359 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
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held that the plaintiff shareholder had made out a prima facie case
by alleging and proving (1) that he was a shareholder of the corporation (2) that he made demand for inspection, and (3) that
the corporation refused the demand. The rule in Delaware is substantially the same." However the Illinois rule requires in addition
to these, an allegation of a specific proper purpose for the inspection, 45 and though there have been no Texas decisions to date on
this aspect of article 2.44, it may well be that Texas will follow the
Illinois rule, since the wording of the two statutes in this respect
is very similar.
How specific should the pleadngs be as to purpose? This problem
is similar to the one just discussed above concerning the problem of
how specific the demand must be. However two Delaware cases4
deal with this problem but do not necessarily apply to the demand,
and thus the topic is treated separately at this point. These Delaware cases deal with demands to see the corporate books as contrasted with demands to see the stock ledger and would probably
have been decided differently if the demand had been for inspection
of the latter. The cases held that the pleadings must state a specific
purpose because this is part of the shareholder's prima facie case.
In State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc.4" the court said, "[the] purpose
must not only be proved, but must, also, be alleged not by a mere
general statement that it is a proper one, but by the allegation of
specific facts, from which the propriety of such purpose will appear."
The court went on to question whether a mere allegation 'that the
shareholder wished to ascertain the value of his stock fulfilled this
requirement, but since there was no preliminary motion to dismiss
the petition, evidently waiving the matter, the court did not actually
hold that the pleading was insufficient.
WHO MAY MAKE INSPECTION?

In most jurisdictions and and under article 1328 of the Texas
statutes the only requirement in order to have the inspection right
is that the person be a shareholder (either common or preferred) of
the corporation;4 this is usually taken to include the executor or
administrator of the deceased stockholder.49 However, under the new
4 Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchner, 40 Del. 105, 5 A.2d 519 (1939).
4 Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 11. 228, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944).
41 State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., 42 Del. 73, 28 A.2d 148
(Super. Ct.
1942); State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 Atl. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931).
4734 Del. 538, 156 Atl. 170, 172 (Super. Ct. 1931).
4 Indianapolis Street Ry. Co. v. State, 203 Ind. 534, 181 N.E. 365 (1932).
41State ex rel. Burke v. Citizens' Bank, 51 La. Ann. 426, 25 So. 318 (1899); Feick v.
Hill Bread Co., 91 N.J.L. 486, 103 Atl. 813 (Sup. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 513, 105
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Illinois and Texas statutes there are provisions applicable to certain
types of shareholders. The Illinois act reads: "Any person who shall
have been a shareholder of record ... for at least six months .. .
or who shall be the holder of record of at least five per cent of all
the outstanding shares ...shall have the right to examine ...for
any proper purpose, its [the corporation's] books and records. . .."
Later on in the same section: "Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competent jurisdiction ...irrespective of the period of time during which such shareholder shall have
been a shareholder of record, and irrespective of the number of
shares held by him, to compel by mandamus or otherwise the production for examination ...of the books. . . ." Article 2.44 of the
Texas act is substantially the same. Thus to bring himslf within the
first provision the shareholder must prove that he has either been a
shareholder of record for at least six months preceding the demand
or that he owns at least five per cent of the stock. A problem concerning this came up in the Illinois case of Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp." Sawers purchased some stock of the corporation and,
before six months had passed, demanded access to the books for inspection. Upon refusal of his demand, he filed suit for mandamus.
Then the six-month period elapsed and Sawers again made demand
for inspection. On appeal Sawers tried to relate his suit to the later
demand which brought him within the class of six-month shareholders, but the court held that mandamus should not be issued because the two demands were both part of the same attempt to inspect, which had begun prior to the lapsing of the six-month period;
the suit originally had been filed prior to the lapsing of the six
months and the validity had to be determined as of the time it was
filed. However this problem seems to be more of theoretical interest
in Illinois than of practical importance since the last paragraph of the
statute seems to give the same right of inspection to all the shareholders that the first paragraph of the act gives to the restricted
class. For this reason there appears to be little use in attempting
to qualify within the class of the first paragraph.
This has not always been true in Illinois. The last part of the act,
which gives the inspection right to all shareholders, at one time did
not contain the phrase "irrespective of the period of time during
which such shareholder shall have been a shareholder of record, and
At. 725 (Ct. Err. & App. 1918). But see In re Hastings, 120 App. Div. 756, 105 N.Y.
Supp. 834 (1st Dep't 1907).
50111.
Ann. Stat. c. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See note 109 infra for text.
"1404 Il. 440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1950).
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irrespective of the number of shares held by him." While the law
read thus, the Illinois court in Neiman v. Templeton, Kenly & Co."
held that only shareholders who had owned stock for more than
six months or owned at least five per cent of the shares could get
mandamus for inspection under this statute. This was done in spite
of the last paragraph of the statute which read, "Nothing herein
contained shall impair the power of any court of competent jurisdiction, upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose, . . . to
compel ... the production for examination . . . of the books and
records.., of a corporation." (Emphasis added.) The court reasoned
that to interpret the clause otherwise would be to nullify the restriction contained in the earlier part of the section, and therefore
this last clause should be interpreted as extending the common-law
limits of the object for which examination could be sought, rather
than broadening the class of shareholders who could get inspection
under the act. The later insertion of the above-quoted phrases seems
to indicate an intention that the last paragraph refer to the class
of shareholders who can get inspection under the statute, and to
give the inspection right to all shareholders; it was not intended to
apply only to the object of the inspection. That the Illinois statute
now applies to all shareholders was recognized in an Illinois Supreme
Court dictum in Sawers v. American PhenolicCorp.5 and would seem
to be the law both under the Illinois and Texas acts.
There appear to be times when no one has the right of inspection
appurtenant to certain stock. In a Louisiana case," a stockholder
placed his stock in escrow pursuant to a contract of sale. A New
York case had similar facts.5 Both courts held that the sale had
been consummated and consequently the vendor, who was still the
shareholder of record, had no inspection rights. On the other hand,
another New York case 6 held that one claiming to be a shareholder
but who was not listed as such in the stock books of the corporation,
also could not get mandamus to inspect the books. In most instances
this rule will be of no importance, but if similar facts arise and the
corporation wrongfully refuses to transfer the stocks on its books,
the stockholder can acquire the inspection right by compelling
transference in a proceeding for that purpose."
52294 Ill. App. 45, 13 N.E.2d 290 (1938).
'3404 Ill.440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1950).
4 State ex rel. Bulkley v. Whited & Wheless, Ltd., 104 La. 125, 28 So. 922 (1900).
" In re Gaines, 180 N.Y. Supp. 191 (Sup. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 190 App. Div. 941, 179
N.Y. Supp. 922. (1st Dep't 1920).
'eIn re Reiss, 30 Misc. 234, 62 N.Y. Supp. 145 (Sup. Ct. 1900). Also see State ex
rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing Co., 113 S.W.2d 1061. (Mo. Ct. App. 1938).
" State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing Co., Inc., supra note 56.
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Under the Illinois act, holders of voting trust certificates are expressly granted the same right of inspection that the shareholders
have.5" In the absence of such a provision, holders of voting trust
certificates are not usually given the inspection right with respect
to corporate books and records.5 This would seem to be required
by any statute such as the Texas one that gives the inspection right
to shareholders of record. The Delaware statute granting the right
of inspection of stock ledgers also limits the inspection to shareholders of record. Thus, evidently, holders of certificates cannot
demand inspection but their trustees can. State ex rel. Healy v.
Superior Oil Corp.6 held that any person who was on the stock
ledger could inspect the stock ledger of the corporation, despite
the fact that that person is merely a nominee. The same statute,
title 8, section 220, also limits the right of inspection of the books
of the corporation to the persons listed on the stock ledger, and thus
again it appears that holders of voting trust certificates are left
with no right to inspect corporate books. Probably the same rule
would apply to holders of street certificates; i.e., they would not be
allowed inspection rights. 1
One other case should be noted here. Sometimes a person who
at first glance seems to have lost his status as a shareholder may in
reality still have it and thereby still have his inspection rights. In
State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co.62 Waldman demanded inspection of the corporate books, and the corporation replied by redeeming his stock. Waldman then filed suit for mandamus. The
corporation answered that his status as a stockholder had ceased
prior to the filing of the petition, leaving him no right to inspection. The court held that the redemption had been invalid and ineffective because it was not done in accordance with the provisions
of the certificate of incorporation; Waldman still had the right of
inspection because he was still a shareholder.
5Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd 1954). See note 109 infra for text.
"' However the court in Brentmore Estates, Inc. v. Hotel Barbizon, Inc., 263 App.
Div. 389, 33 N.Y.S.2d 331 (1st Dep't 1942), set forth a dictum in which it stated that
it would be possible for a stockholder to reserve the inspection right by the terms of the

voting trust agreement and although this reservation would not give him an inspection
right under the shareholder inspection statute because he would not be a shareholder
of record, it could be enforced by mandamus under the common law right of inspection.
But no later case has been found in which this has ever been attempted, much less held
valid.
6040 Del. 460, 13 A.2d 453 (Super. Ct. 1940).
"sIn a dictum in the Superior Oil Case, ibid, the court quoted with approval from
Cheatham v. Wheeling & L.E. Ry., 37 F.2d 593, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1930), which held that a
holder of a street certificate is not entitled to any of the privileges of a stockholder.
6242 Del. 73, 28 A.2d 148

(Super. Ct. 1942).
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WHAT IS A PROPER PURPOSE FOR INSPECTION?

The new Texas statute, the cases under the old Texas statute,"
the Illinois statute, and the Delaware cases both at common law""
and under the stock ledger statute"s require that the purpose of the
inspection be proper. A good definition of proper purpose is set out
in Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp.:'"
The proper purpose required by the statute, then, is one wherein a
stockholder seeks information bearing upon the protection of his interest and that of other stockholders in the corporation. He must be
seeking something more than a satisfaction of his curiosity and not be
conducting a general fishing expedition.
Of course the purpose is improper where it is to gain knowledge
of the corporate affairs in order to aid a competitor, and the inspection will not be granted for such a purpose."' Similarly, an intent to defraud the corporation has been held to be an improper
purpose. 8
Under Texas article 1328, since proof of a proper purpose was
not required of the shareholder, there is little discussion of what is
a proper purpose, most of the discussion in the few cases centering
on what is or is not an improper purpose. In Grayburg Oil Co. v.
Jarratt0 the court held that it was not improper for the shareholder
to seek a list of the shareholders in order to inform them about
what he considered bad management practices by the officers and
0 the
directors. In Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp."
court held that
the mere fact that the shareholder and the officers of the corporation were on unfriendly terms was no proof of improper purpose.
It was also ruled that it is not improper for the shareholder to hope
to find something improper on the part of the management and to
alarm other shareholders with his news. This is an approval of fishing
expeditions by the Commission of Appeals that is in contradiction
63Guaranty Old Line Life Co. v. McCallum, 97 S.W.2d 966 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Grayburg Oil Co. v. Jarratt, 16 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Roberts v. Munroe,
193 S.W. 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error dism.
64State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 At. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931); Mercantile Trading Co. v. Rosenbaum Grain Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 325, 154 Ati. 457 (Ch. 1931);
State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 24 Del. 379, 77 Ad. 16 (1910).
65State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 41 Del. 172, 18 A.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1941);
Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchner, 40 Del. 105, 5 A.2d 519 (1939); State ex rel. Theile v.
Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 Atl. 773 (1922).
6'404 Ill. 440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1950).
67People ex rel. Lehman v. Consolidated Fire Alarm Co., 142 App. Div. 753, 145 App.
Div. 427, 127 N.Y. Supp. 348 (1st Dep't 1911).
"6Roberts v. Munroe, 193 S.W. 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error dism.
69 16 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
7059 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
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to the language in the above quote from the Sawers case. The Commission justified its ruling by the following reasoning:
If in truth and in fact no alarming condition exists, presumably it will
not be found through any examination made by plaintiffs in error. If
there is existent anything in the financial affairs of the company which
would be reasonably calculated to alarm the stockholders in general we
see no reason why plaintiffs in error could not properly communicate
such fact to other stockholders."'
This opinion was not adopted by the Supreme Court and perhaps,
in view of the somewhat friendlier attitude towards corporations
as reflected in the new act, the Supreme Court will hold that, while
such fishing expeditions may have some value, the inconvenience
to the corporation is greater, and therefore fishing expeditions will
not be allowed.
Several Illinois cases have ruled on the propriety of the purposes
of the shareholder seeking inspection. In Wise v. H. M. Byllesby 0
Co."' the court held the following to be proper purposes: ". . . to
determine the true value of the company's capital stock; its prospective ability to pay its secured debt in July, 1935; its ability to
pay any other matured or maturing debts or obligations; the dealings between the corporation, its officers and directors, and subsidiary, affiliated and controlled corporations, their officers and directors; and whether there are any liabilities to the corporation by
the officers and directors thereof, or by others, in connection with
its affairs." With regard to the specificity of the demand and allegations, discussed earlier, it should be noted that these purposes
above stated seem to be very specific but when examined more
closely some of them are actually localized fishing expeditions.
Another case has held that gaining outside representation on the
board of directors for minority stockholders is a proper purpose."
Also speculation has been held a proper purpose where the president
of the corporation made offers to all the stockholders to buy their
stock and a shareholder wanted the shareholder list to enable him
to make a higher blanket offer to each."4 However, in the absence of
such justifying circumstances, speculation is an improper purpose."
It is not necessary to show mismanagement of the corporation in
order to show a proper purpose for the inspection,"6 but the share" Id. at 818.
Il. App. 40, 1 N.E.2d 536 (1936).
7' Doggett v. North American Life Ins. Co., 396 I1. 354, 71 N.E.2d 686 (1947),
rev'g, 328 Ill. App. 613, 66 N.E.2d 747 (1946).
" Crouse v. Rogers Park Apartments, Inc., 343 Il1. App. 319, 99 N.E.2d 404 (1951).
"SMorris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 Ill. 228, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944).
7Doggett v. North American Life Ins. Co., 328 Ill. App. 613, 66 N.E.2d 747 (1946),
rev'd on other grounds, 396 I1. 354, 71 N.E.2d 686 (1947).
72285
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holder must show some effort on his part to determine the condition
of the corporation other than the single demand to see the books
and must also show that he has taken advantage of all reasonable
corporate offerings of information in order to prove a proper purpose.
The Delaware courts speak in terms of "purpose connected with
the shareholder's status as shareholder" as much as they do of "proper
purpose" when they are discussing the merits of the purpose." One
of the earliest Delaware cases on shareholder inspection rights, Swift
v. State ex rel. Richardson," concerned a purpose not closely con-

nected with the plaintiff's status as shareholder, but which was held
to be proper. The shareholder incurred some debt and pledged his
stock in the corporation to his sureties on the debt. The sureties
were to collect not just the dividends on the stock, but a percentage
of the net earnings of the stock. When the primary debt was paid,
the sureties prepared to sell the stock in order to collect the net
earnings to which they believed themselves to be entitled, and
which had not been paid to them by the shareholder. The shareholder
demanded inspection of the books in order to show that the stock
had had no net earnings during the time the sureties had held the
stock, and thereby prevent the sale of his stock.
In State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co."° the share-

holder stated his purposes to be the following: to obtain evidence as to
actual value of his stock, his stock constituting a substantial percentage of the outstanding shares; to ascertain whether illegally
issued preferred stock was issued below par; to determine under
what unlawful contracts the corporation was conducting its business; to determine the assets and liabilities of the corporation and
its earning power. These purposes were held to be proper.
Another Delaware case, State ex rel. Nat'l Bank v. Jessup F

Moore Paper Co.,8 held that neither failure of the shareholder to
vote at a shareholders' meeting nor his failure to be present at a
shareholders' meeting where some of the books were open to inspection showed an improper purpose. This seems to be in conflict with
the Illinois rule mentioned above. The only possible distinguishing
factor might be that here the shareholder was itself a corporation,
"Sawers

v. American Phenolic Corp., 404 Ill.
440, 89 N.E.2d 374 (1950).
514, 115 At. 773 (1922).

'State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del.
" 12 Del. 338, 6 At. 856 (1886).

8024 Del. 379, 77 At. 16 (1910).
"' 27 Del. 248, 88 Ad. 449 (Super. Ct. 1913).
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and, with the division of responsibility, would be more likely to miss
the inspection at the meeting by an oversight, especially if it did
not for policy reasons take a regular part in the control of the corporation.
State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co.' was a case in which the
shareholder was engaging in a derivative suit against the corporation
and wanted a list of the shareholders for the purpose of mailing
them a summary of the pleadings in the pending litigation, seeing
if any of the other shareholders wished to join him in conducting
the suit, and soliciting proxies for the purpose of changing the
personnel of the board of directors. The first and third purposes
were held proper, but the second was held to be inappropriate. The
court said that there was no public policy against acquainting the
real owners of the corporation with the circumstances surrounding
a derivative suit against the corporation; in fact the public policy
was on the side of the shareholders receiving the knowledge.
In State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Service Co." the shareholder wanted
the stock lists to use in his business of selling stock lists for profit.
The court held that such a purpose would not sustain a suit for
mandamus because it was in no way connected with the shareholder's status as a shareholder.
WHO HAS THE BURDEN

OF PROVING PROPER PURPOSE?

In Texas, under article 1328, the burden of proving proper purpose is not on the shareholder; rather the burden is on the corporation to prove an improper purpose." In Moore v. Rock Creek Oil
Corp.,8' the Commission of Appeals said:
Where a stockholder seeks to enforce by mandamus the statutory right
of inspection, he has made a prima facie case when he alleges his interest as a stockholder and the refusal of the corporation to grant him
such right of inspection after proper demand therefor. It is not essential that he allege or prove that in seeking the issuance of such writ
he is acting in good faith and for an honest purpose. . . . But when
the corporation pleads, and is able to establish by proof, a state of facts
sufficient to convince the court that the stockholder is not seeking the
information . . . for the protection of his interest as a stockholder, or
that of the corporation, but that he is actuated by corrupt or unlawful motives, the court will not, by the issuance of its writ of mandamus, aid him to consummate such corrupt and unlawful purposes.
8241 Del.

172, 18 A.2d 235 (Super. Ct. 1941).

"331 Del. 514, 115 Ad. 773 (1922).
84Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App., 1933); Dreyfus$
& Son v. Benson, 239 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error ref.
" 59 S.W.2d 815, 818 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
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In Illinois, under section 45 of the Business Corporations Act, the
Supreme Court of that state has held that the burden of proof of
proper purpose is always on the shareholder. It must be remembered
that the statute divides the shareholders into two classes (general
shareholders and those that have either owned stock for more than
six months or own at least five per cent of the stock), but still
the Illinois rule is that both classes have the burden of proving
proper purpose. The leading case is Morris v. Broadview, Inc.' The
opinion starts out with statements of general rules of statutory interpretation, such as "the entire section must be read together and
so construed, as to make it harmonious and consistent in all its parts"
and "if possible we must give meaning to each word, clause and sentence" and "the section should be so construed that no clause,
sentence or word should be superfluous." Then the court goes into
the historical background and shows that the prior statutes gave
an almost absolute right of inspection to the shareholder. It was
clear that the legislature by the new act intended to restrict the
shareholder's inspection rights. The court said:
Considering the change in the statute clearly abrogating the absolute
right of shareholders to a definitely limited right of inspection, the
only reasonable interrpretation that will afford meaning to every
clause and word of the section in question is that the legislative intent
was to limit the right of examination to an allegation and proof of a
specified purpose which is proper and legitimate, for the protection of
the stockholder's investment."
The opinion continued:
What then was the legislative intent expressed in the amendment of
1941, which gives to any stockholder, irrespective of time of ownership or amount, the remedy of mandamus to compel access to the
records, upon proof by the shareholder of proper purpose? The clause
for "proper purpose" appears in each paragraph of section 45. It is inconceivable that, by the amendment of 1941, the legislature intended

to render the clause referred to as superfluous in the first paragraph, as
appellee would have us do. Such an interpretation would contravene one
of the above mentioned primary rules of construction. It is equally inconceivable that the legislative intent was to give such effect to the
1941 amendment as to completely nullify the limitations and classification of shareholders mentioned in the first paragraph. To leave in the
act a limitation in one paragraph and to completely nullify it in another would create an absurdity which we cannot assume was intended.
Thus it will be seen that the main argument the court has for
:6385 Il. 228, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944).
'7 52 N.E.2d at 771-72.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol, 12

holding as it did is that to hold otherwise would make the section
internally inconsistent and nullify part of it. There is no basis
whatsoever for this contention; rather it is the strained construction of the court which nullifies, and renders superfluous part of
the section. To use the phraseology of the last above-quoted sentence, to create in the act a right for a sub-class in one paragraph
and to create the same right for the whole class in another would
create an absurdity which we cannot assume was intended. Under
the Illinois rule the first right would be superfluous because entirely
enveloped by the second.
The court points out that the phrase "proper purpose" occurs
in each of the paragraphs and says that its construction of the statute does not nullify the phrase in the first paragraph, implying
that any other interpretation would nullify the phrase. The fact
that "proper purpose" is a requirement of both paragraphs tends
to indicate that the court's construction is erroneous, for the words
"upon proof by a shareholder of" precede the phrase "proper
purpose" only in the last paragraph. If the legislative intent was identical in each paragraph as to the placing of the burden of proof,
it would take some cogent reason to explain why the language was
not identical; and the court offers none.
It would seem that the only way to give full effect to each "word,
clause, and sentence" of the section is to construe the statute as
giving the inspection right to all shareholders upon proof of proper
purpose, and further giving the inspection right to the select subclass of shareholders without proof of proper purpose, the propriety
of the purpose being a defensive matter to be pleaded and proved
by the corporation.
The court gave one further reason for its construction. The Illinois act contained a penalty provision applicable to any person or
corporation that would not allow the inspection "for any proper
purpose." Thus the phraseology of the "proper purpose" requirement was identical in this and the first paragraph. The court said:
"Clearly the clause has the same meaning in both paragraphs and it
could hardly be contended that a suit for a recovery of the penalty
could be maintained without allegation and proof of a proper purpose for the demand." Whatever the merits of this argument in
Illinois," it has no merit in Texas for the corresponding Texas pro"8Laws Ill. 325 (1919), the Illinois statute which immediately preceded the present inspection statute, contained a penal clause similar to the one now in force; it was interpreted in Morris v. Broadview, Inc. There was no mention of proper purpose anywhere
in this statute. In Babcock v. Harrsch, 310 Ill. 413, 141 N.E. 701 (1923), this penal
provision was held not to be violative of the due process clause of the Illinois Constitu-
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vision article 2.44 has no such penalty provision and there is no
comparable provision in any other Texas statute.
It is submitted that article 2.44 of the Texas Business Corporations
Act should not be construed in accordance with the Illinois authority, because the validity of the reasoning of such authority is
doubtful in Illinois and nonexistent in Texas. The construction of
the statute contrary to the Illinois authority would be consonant
with the apparant legislative intent to protect the corporations
from needless and vexatious inspections, and would place the conflicting interests of corporate efficiency and shareholder rights in
better balance.
In Delaware the burden of proof is on the shareholder in one
instance and on the corporation in the other. In suits to inspect the
stock ledger under title 8, section 220 of the Delaware Code, the
shareholder does not have to prove proper purpose; the corporation
has the burden of proving an improper' purpose in order to defeat
the inspection.9 ' However, when the shareholder is suing on his
common law right to inspect the books of the corporation, he must
allege and prove proper purpose."' A recent case by the Delaware
Supreme Court" throws a slight shadow of doubt on this rule, for
the court seemed to go out of its way to state that, for the purposes of the opinion, it was assuming rather than holding that the
burden of proof of proper purpose is on the shareholder; this was
done in a situation in which courts commonly dicta as though they
were rulings of the case.
ARE FOREIGN CORPORATIONS SUBJECT TO INSPECTION?

Inspection of the books of foreign corporations is generally allowed,
subject of course to the requirement that the corporation must be
doing business within the state. The Illinois case of Wise v. H. M.
Byllesby & Co. 2 held that section 103 of the Illinois statutes" required foreign corporations to have the same duty of allowing intion, and in the plaintiff's pleadings there was no allegation of proper purpose nor was
there anything in the report of the case indicating that the defendants asserted improper
purpose as a defense. In fact there is no mention of proper purpose anywhere in the
case. If a penal clause is enacted and held constitutional which is enforceable without
allowing a defense of improper purpose then certainly there is no reason for refusing to
interpret a statute in a manner such that it would allow assessment of the penalty, subject to a defense of improper purpose.
"9 State ex rel. Bloch v. Sentry Safety Control Corp., 41 Del. 480, 24 A.2d 587 (Super.
Ct. 1942); Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchner, 40 Del. 105, 5 A.2d 519 (1939).
90State ex rel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., 42 Del. 73, 28 A.2d 148 (Super. Ct.
1942); State ex rel. Miller v. Loft, Inc., 34 Del. 538, 156 Atl. 170 (Super. Ct. 1931).
" Nodana Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Brennan, -Del.-, 123 A.2d 243 (1956).
92285 Ill. App. 40, 1 N.E.2d 536 (1936).
9111. Ann. Stat. c. 32, § 157.103 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
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spection as domestic corporations. Article 8.02 4 of the Texas act
is substantially the same and presumably would have the same result.
This rule also is in effect in Delaware. s
How THE RIGHT MAY BE ENFORCED

As indicated in the above-quoted dictum from Rex v. The Fraternity of Hostnen, the remedy from the eariest times has generally
been in the nature of a writ of mandamus ordering the custodian
of the books to allow the shareholder to inspect them. This has generally been true in the various jurisdictions throughout the United
States. Texas has followed this accepted method of enforcing shareholder inspection rights in the past and will presumably do so in
the future. Under article 1328" of the Revised Civil Satutes of
Texas, the right given has consistently been enforced by mandamus."7
The form of the remedy seems to have affected the substantive law
of inspection in Texas, or at least allowed the Commission of Appeals to rationalize its decision in Moore v. Rock. Creek Oil Corp., 8
for it held that the right of inspection under article 1328 was absolute but that since the general rules applicable to the issuance of
a writ of mandamus required that it not be issued to perpetrate a
wrong, the absolute legal right would not be enforced unless the
shareholder had a proper purpose in seeking the inspection. The
court said:
It must be borne in mind that the enforcement of the right is by
mandamus. Such a writ is not issued as a matter of right, but in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion which allows the court to view
other considerations than the mere legal right of the relator."
It is presumed that the enforcement of the right in Texas will still
be by mandamus under the new provision of the Texas Business
Corporations Act which concerns the inspection right of shareholders, article 2.44."" There are no cases yet in which enforcement
of the right has been sought, but the strongest precedents for' the
Texas courts outside of the decisions under article 1328, are the
"4Tex. Bus. Corp. Act art. 8.02 (1956).
'State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 24 Del. 379, 77 Atl. 16 (1910).
"Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Ann. art. 1328 (1945).
97E.g., see Moore v. Rock Creek Oil Corp., 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933);
Smith v. Trumbull Farmers Gin Co., 89 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Dreyfuss
& Son v. Benson, 239 S.W. 347 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) error ref.
98 59 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
"9id. at 817.
199 For text of this statute, see note 11 supra.
9
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Illinois decisions; and the right is customarily enforced in Illinois
by writ of mandamus. 1 '
In Delaware, also, mandamus is the usual method of enforcing
the inspection right,' ° but it would seem possible that the right
can also be enforced by an action in equity when the rights of the
person suing for inspection are not cognizable in a court of law.
In Parrish v. Commonwealth Trust Co."°8 the Court of Chancery
of Delaware held that a court of equity had no power to order an
inspection by a stockholder of corporate books as a matter of primary and independent relief, even though the stockholder was not
of record but was only a holder of a voting trust certificate (and
thus a person whose interest as a shareholder was cognizable only
in a court of equity). However a later lower court holding in State
ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corp. 4 explained that the holding in the
Parrish Case was not as strong as it seemed:
The decision, however, does not justify the conclusion that the Court
of Chancery will, in no circumstances, afford to a holder of a voting
trust certificate the relief of an order of inspection.'

The court also said that the voting trust certificate holder, who
was seeking inspection by mandamus, had possiby mistaken his
forum, implying that he might have been successful had he sought
to enforce his inspection right by injunction. It is not clear from
this opinion under what circumstances a court of equity will order
inspection, but a later lower court case"' seems to return to the
Parrish rule that a court of equity cannot order inspection as a
matter of independent relief but can only do so when the information is necessary and relevant to the issues of pending litigation to
which the corporation is a party. Thus, in its present state, the Delaware law is unclear as to whether the inspection right can be enforced
by an independent suit in equity. On the other hand, a federal
district court case in Pennsylvania, Steinberg v. American Bantam
Car Co.," 7 indicates that an injunction probably will be issued to
enjoin corporate action if the action was such as required shareholder approval and the shareholder can show that, if he had been
'E.g.,

see Morris v. Broadview, Inc., 385 Ill. 228, 52 N.E.2d 769 (1944); Hohman

v. Illinois-Iowa Power Co., 305 Ill. App. 17, 26 N.E.2d 420 (1940); Neiman v. Templeton, Kenley & Co., 294 Ill. App. 45, 13 N.E.2d 290 (1938).
102 E.g., see State ex rel. Brumley v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., 24 Del. 379,
77 Atl.
16 (1910); Swift v. State ex rel. Richardson, 12 Del. 379, 6 Ad. 856 (1886).
03
" 21 Del. Ch. 121, 181 Atl. 658 (Ch. 1935).
10441 Del. 84, 15 A.2d 661 (Super. Ct. 1940).
105 Id. at 664.
.. State ex rel. Foster v. Standard Oil Co., 41 Del. 172, 18 A.2d 235 (Super Ct. 1941).
107 76 F. Supp. 426 (W.D. Pa. 1948).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 12

allowed access to corporate records, the action could well have taken
a different course. However the law on this point is in an undeveloped state. In the Bantam Car Co. case Steinberg, the plaintiff,
sued as a shareholder to enjoin a shareholders meeting in order to
enable him and his fellow shareholders to solicit proxies adverse to
management. The need for additional time was created by the inaction of the corporation. The court held that "where the stockholders are unable to investigate the affairs of a corporation a sufficient length of time prior to the annual meeting of the stockholders, so as to secure the will of all before the election of directors,
• . . a court of equity should exercise its undoubted authority to
supervise and control the corporate election with reasonable limitations..... It went on to say the irreparable loss that Steinberg
would suffer in the absence of an injunction would be the loss of his
right to inspect and copy the shareholder lists sufficiently in advance of the shareholders meeting to enable him to communicate
with other shareholders regarding the condition of the company. A
case of complete denial of access to stock lists would seem to be
an even stronger case for the shareholder seeking an injunction.
The Illinois act has a provision... which assesses a penalty of ten
'0'Id. at 440.
09111.
Ann. Stat. c. 32, § 157.45 (Smith-Hurd 1954) reads as follows:
§ 157.45 Books and records-Examination by shareholders.
Each corporation shall keep correct and complete books and records of account and
shall also keep minutes of the proceedings of its shareholders and board of directors; and
shall keep at its registered office or principal place of business in this State, or at the
office of a transfer agent or registrar in this State, a record of its shareholders, giving
the names and addresses of all shareholders and the number and class of the shares held
by each. Any person who shall have been a shareholder of record or the holder of a
voting trust certificate for at least six months immediately preceding his demand or who
shall be the holder of record of at least five per cent of all the outstanding share of
a corporation, shall have the right to examine, in person, or by agent or attorney, at any
reasonable time or times, for any proper purpose, its books and records of account, minutes and record of shareholders and to make extracts therefrom. A record of shareholders
certified by an officer or transfer agent shall be competent evidence in all courts of this
state.
Any officer, or agent, or a corporation which shall refuse to allow any such shareholder
or such holder of a voting trust certificate, or his agent or attorney, so to examine and
extract from its books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders,
for any proper purpose, shall be liable to such shareholder or such holder of a voting
trust certificate in a penalty of ten per cent of the value of the shares owned by such
shareholder or ten per cent of the value of the beneficial interest owned by such voting
trust certificate holder, in addition to any other damages or remedy afforded him by law.
It shall be a defense to any action for penalties under this section that the person suing
therefor has within two years sold or offered for sale any list of shareholders of such
corporation or any other corporation or has aided or abetted any person in procuring any
list of shareholders for any such purpose, or has improperly used any information secured
through any prior examination of the books and records of account or minutes, or record
of shareholders of such corporation or any ther corporation.
Nothing herein contained shall impair the power of any court of competent jurisdiction,
upon proof by a shareholder of proper purpose, irrespective of the period of time during
which such shareholder shall have been a shareholder or record, and irrespective of the
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per cent of the value of the shares owned by the shareholder
against any officer, agent or corporation which refuses to allow
an inspection founded on a proper purpose. It seems that this provision persuades the officers of the corporation to grant the inspection in all cases except where they are certain that the purpose is im-

proper and they can establish that fact in court. Thus the penalty
provision may tend to cause improper inspections to be allowed by
officers for the sole reason that the officers are fearful of the penalty
they will have to pay if they are not successful in court. The Texas
act has no penalty provision and there is none at common law in

Delaware.
CONCLUSION

Generally the statutes and decisions of the jurisdictions covered
in this Comment seem to cope intelligently with the problems of
granting inspection rights to a shareholder in such a manner as to
strike a fair balance between the intrinsic rights of inspection of the
shareholder, which flow from his beneficial ownership, and the
right of the officials of the company to protect the efficient management of the corporation for the benefit of all the shareholders. The
only exception to this is the holding of the Illinois court that the
burden of proof of proper purpose is on the shareholder regardless
of his having owned stock for more than six months or his owning
at least five per cent of the stock. This seems to put an undue burden on the shareholders who are most likely to have a proper purpose
for making an inspection and ignores a distinction which seems to
have been intended by the legislature. On the other hand the statutes
themselves are not perfect. The six-months time qualification for
stock ownership seems to be insufficient and should probably be
increased to one year, in order to more nearly assure that stockholders who meet this qualification have a proper purpose in seeking
the inspection. However it would be a waste of time for the legislature to make such a change in Illinois or Texas while the Morris
case is controlling, for under it the qualifications of five per cent
and six months are merely worthless verbage.
The only way for the legislatures to make an informed judgment
of the inspection statutes would be to make a factual study of the
expense and inconvenience caused to corporations by inspections,
and the frequency with which inspections have been made in the
number of shares held by him, to compel by mandamus or otherwise the production for
examination by such shareholder of the books and records of account, minutes, and record
of shareholders of a corporation.

84
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past. These factors should be considered in the light of the extent
to which the inspection right allows the shareholders to perform
"watch dog" duties on improper action by corporate officials and the
weight which should be given to the time-honored feeling that the
shareholders should have some inspection right since they are the
beneficial owners of the corporation. Only by accurately determining these facts can the legislatures evaluate their past work and
determine what improvements are needed.
William T. Blackburn

